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Abstract: 
In this article we examine the hundreds of videos that were posted to YouTube in response to the 
fierce anti-Islam video Fitna.  We use this case to analyse whether and how the participatory 
opportunities of the digital technologies invite performances of citizenship, especially with respect to 
the articulation of religious and/or political identity. The sheer numbers of YouTube activities (videos, 
views and comments) demonstrated that this was not at all a marginal phenomenon within the wider 
Fitna and Wilders controversy, making the question as to what these videos mean, or – to be more 
precise - for which contexts the posters make them meaningful, all the more pressing.  We used the 
concepts of ‘voice’, ‘performance’ and ‘citizenship’ to approach this issue  and found that  the video 
genres unique to visual digital culture (tagging/jamming, cut-and-mix and vlogs) each invited their 
own kinds of political and religious performances, and assumed particular traits and interests of their 
audience. The most common YouTube reaction for Muslims was to upload copies of videos that 
expressed their own understanding of Islam as a peaceful religion in contrast to the picture drawn by 
Wilders. The jamming videos saying sorry were unique digital means of activism, enabling a particular 
participation in the controversy around Fitna that assumed a global audience open to apology. The 
cut-and-mix videos, appeared to be especially welcome means for satire and parody and appealing to 
audience emotions, but also for the deconstruction of Fitna which addressed audience cognitive 
competence.  Vlogging about Fitna, was often part of a more regular practice of video production 
that was individually or institutionally maintained. We conclude that the particular articulations of 
religious and political identities, with different modes of audience address assume a connectedness 
between dispersed people in which new forms of(unlocated) citizenship emerge.  
Citizenship in today’s multicultural, multireligious, and multimedia societies is confronted with a 
myriad of political and conceptual challenges that are not easily understood in the standard 
frameworks of citizenship as a legal, political or social status, or of citizenship as an acknowledged 
cultural identity. Nowhere is this clearer than in the charged debates and confrontations about the 
position of Islam and Muslims in predominantly secular or Christian societies.  In this article we use 
one such confrontation to demonstrate how the current multimedia environment necessitates a 
wider understanding of citizenship in which digital practices and occasional online acts are included 
and assessed as performances of citizenship. Our starting point is the Dutch fierce anti-Islam video 
Fitna, produced in 2008 by a member of the Dutch parliament, Geert Wilders, and released through 
a video-sharing website (LiveLeak) on the Internet.  The film contained verses from the Quran, cut 
with footage of the terrorist attacks in New York and Madrid, fragments from notorious anti-Islam 
films such as Obsession: Radical Islam’s War against The West, and The Violent Oppression of Women 
in Islam, images and statistics suggesting the Islamization of The Netherlands and Europe.1 In the 
Netherlands and across the world, many Muslims and other critics expressed their anger in various 
ways, ranging from diplomatic questions to violent street protest.  The latter was covered by 
international news media and therewith, from the beginning, the release of Fitna became an issue 
that exceeded the boundaries of the Dutch nation state. The Dutch MP himself eagerly nurtured the 
controversy by recurrently staging international arguments: despite a ban of the Home Office on him 
coming to the UK to introduce Fitna in The House of Lords in early February 2009, Wilders tried to 
enter the country nevertheless, with over 50 journalists in his wake who witnessed how the 
immigration officers refused him. After successfully appealing the ban, his visit to the House of Lords, 
in October 2009, caught wide media attention once again, although significantly less than when he 
had been refused entry. When the Turkish authorities declared in late 2009 that they would not 
receive a Dutch parliamentary delegation if the controversial MP was part of it, Wilders was quick to 
stir up the incident by claiming Turkish intervention in Dutch democratic politics.  
Beyond these highly visual confrontations of the political elites, ordinary citizens have also engaged 
in the pro and contra Fitna arguments using the many opportunities of the Internet to communicate 
their views to dispersed audiences.  Apart from debates on blogs, fora, bulletin boards and other 
online spaces enabling discussion and demonstration, thousands of home made videos were 
uploaded either in protest or support of Wilders and Fitna, suggesting that video upload channels 
have become important arenas for political activity and communication.  In this article we examine 
the videos that were posted to YouTube in order to analyse whether and how the participatory 
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  For a more detailed analysis of the film, especially from the perspective of gender, see Vis, Van Zoonen, 
Mihelj (2010).  
opportunities of the digital technologies invite performances of citizenship, especially with respect to 
the articulation of religious and/or political identity, which is a core issue in Fitna and in the video 
responses to it.2 Before we present our data, we will introduce the theories that inform our approach 
and research questions.   
 
Voice and the performance of citizenship 
Coverage of the Fitna controversies in the Dutch and UK offline news media (press and television) 
was typified by two things: first, reports, analyses and comments focused on the problems that 
Wilders had to get his video distributed as well as whether public broadcasters in the Netherlands 
had the right to refuse to show the film; moreover, whether the ban by the UK Home office was 
appropriate;  or indeed whether the Turkish government could legitimately decline to receive 
Wilders. The coverage thus focused much more on the issue of freedom of speech than on the film’s 
portrayal of Islam (Ruigrok et al, 2009; Knott, Poole and Taira, 2010). Wilders himself has successfully 
exploited an image of himself as relentless freedom fighter whose ideas and life are under 
continuous siege of Islamist terrorists; he is under 24/7 protection of five security guards. It gets him 
the support of many people who do not have a strong anti-Islam sentiment, but who feel that 
everybody should be able to speak their mind. The second feature of mainstream news coverage is 
that the debate is conducted by the societal elite: cabinet members, party leaders, academics, 
religious leaders and the opinion makers of Dutch and UK civil society dominate the news pages and 
programs. Ordinary Muslims are hardly visible as actors who might have a say in this matter (cf. 
Ruigrok et al, 2009; Knott, Poole and Taira, 2010). The absence of ordinary citizens, however, is not 
particular to the Fitna controversy but is a generic feature of all mass mediated news whether about 
Islam (Poole and Richardson 2006; Richardson, 2004), or about other matters (Ericson et al., 1989).  
 Within this context of a news agenda that limited the debate to elite actors who 
predominantly focus on freedom of speech, it is not surprising that the Internet offered a much used 
opportunity for people to present their particular take on Fitna. The democratic affordances of the 
Internet have always been a key appeal to political activists and scientists alike. From its very early 
years as a public medium, the Internet has attracted grass roots activism, bottom-up discussions, and 
religious reflection (see Chadwick and Howard, 2009, for a useful overview). In fact, religion was and 
is one of the most important reasons for people to go online, look for shared religious and spiritual 
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  The research was funded by the AHRC and ESRC (UK) in the context of their Religion and Society Program, 
grant number AH-G016631-1. More information about the project can be found on: 
http://www.lboro.ac.uk/departments/ss/research/FITNA/index.html    
experiences and engage in communal activities (e.g. Barna, 2001; Bunt, 2009; Hoover, Schofield Clark 
and Rainie, 2004). In relation to Web 2.0, Paolilli (2008) has recently found that religion (Christianity 
and Islam in particular) forms a significant cluster among the material people upload on YouTube. 
While the initial euphoric discourses of the Internet as a medium that would open up true 
democratic exchange, build new and global communities and dismantle repressive structures and 
identities (e.g. Rheingold, 1991, 2000) have made way for a more empirically grounded 
understanding of only modest and situated participatory potential of the Internet (e.g. Hirzalla, 
2007), fundamental issues as to who can speak online, in what way, for and to whom are still in full 
theoretical flux, as is the question of who is actually listening in this cacophony of voices.   
The sociological concept of ‘voice’, as developed in Hirschman’s (1970) classic treatise of 
options for participation is a useful starting point for theoretically positioning our examination of the 
YouTube responses to Fitna, but simultaneously identifies the shortcomings of traditional theories 
for thinking about global and visually performed citizenship. Hirschman claims that members of 
organisations but also, for instance, consumers in relation to consumption have three mutually 
related options when they are dissatisfied: exit (departure, which can be physical but also 
emotional), voice (providing feedback) or loyalty (acceptance). The greater the opportunities of 
voice, the lesser the probability of exit and the more chance of loyalty, Hirschman suggests, and vice 
versa. Through such continuous interaction of participatory options, the unit in which the interaction 
is embedded improves and maintains itself. While Hirschman’s framework has successfully been 
used in many different academic disciplines, its key feature that there needs to be an entity with 
which one can interact - which listens to exit, voice and loyalty, so to speak - makes it not simply 
applicable to the global Fitna controversy. Conceptualizing the YouTube videos as ‘voices’ in the 
Hirschman sense produces the question as to what or in which entity these voices are speaking, and 
who - if anyone - is listening? While some of the videos may well be addressed to Wilders, to his 
political party,  or the Dutch state, it is doubtful whether these entities are interested in listening and 
hence participating in the exchange.3   
This tension in the usability of the concept of ‘voice’ can be partly overcome by turning it into 
an empirical question: who or what do the YouTube producers of the videos address? Yet, given the 
outcomes of other kinds of research about the Internet as a discussion platform, it can be expected 
that some or even many of these videos are simply there to make a statement that is relevant to the 
participant who may not be fundamentally interested in whether or how it is listened to. Van Zoonen 
at al. (2007), for instance, analysed the discussions on the bulletin boards of the popular Dr Phil US 
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  It is telling, in this respect, that the formal organisation of Wilders Freedom Party, does not allow for 
membership; financial donations are the only formal means of participation possible.   
television talk show that had invited the 2004 candidates for the US presidency to talk about their 
family lives. The call of the host to his audience to go online and share their own family experiences 
notwithstanding, the ensuing discussions focused on political issues such as the war in Iraq, or the 
state of the economy. Many of the participants only posted one message declaring their position, 
while other more prolonged discussions were conducted in sarcastic and condescending ways, aimed 
at silencing other participants rather than getting them to listen. The authors conclude, therefore, 
that these boards provided a space for simple declarations of political standpoints as much as they 
offered a platform for discussion about them. This particular demonstrative nature of Internet 
discussions, have led many authors to be cynical about the democratic potential of the Internet, 
claiming that it provides a platform without an audience, and produces talk without consequence. 
Keren (2006), for instance, claims in his analysis of the blogosphere that blogging might be seen as an 
expression of dissatisfaction with ‘social control and manipulation by powerful political, corporate 
and media forces’ (p. 149), and ‘an attempt to restore a degree of authenticity, expressing some 
inner truth’ (ibid). It is, however, a truth without impact, according to Keren, ‘largely because of the 
virtual nature of the endeavor’ (p. 152) which would divert bloggers into a fantasy world of words 
that do not ask nor need a response from the powers they resist. 
Such a dark vision of Internet voices is built on the assumption that a voice is only meaningful 
if someone listens. Yet, current developments in citizenship theory offer an alternative 
understanding of such voices, namely as performances that are meaningful in themselves, that 
should be interrogated for what they achieve, not only for a possible audience but also for the 
speakers themselves.  Schudson´s (1998) analysis of the historical developments of the particular 
activities involved in voting offers a clear and historically grounded explanation of such performative 
nature of citizenship. Like Austin´s classic theory of speech acts asks what is accomplished by saying 
something (rather than asking what cognition, opinion, emotion or attitude is reflected), analyzing 
citizenship as performance directs the analysis to the deed, instead of the doer. Citizenship can thus 
be conceptualized as brought into being through embedded practices and routines, as well as 
occasional acts and interactions (cf. Isin en Nielsen, 2008). Citizens are produced by these practices 
and acts, in addition to having a preset status or identity that makes or unmakes them as citizens. In 
other words, by doing citizenship one becomes a citizen, much like poststructuralist identity theory 
claims that by doing gender one becomes a woman or a man (e.g. Butler, 1990).  
Such a concept as citizenship as performative is especially relevant in contexts where there is 
no preset geographical entity or polity to be part of, particularly with respect to issues of global 
relevance and interest such as Fitna. In line with public sphere theory we could argue that public 
debates on such global matters cannot be considered fully legitimate if they do not allow for equal 
exchange with all affected, regardless of formal citizenship (cf. Frazer 2007). For obvious reasons, 
traditional media, operating within nationally-bounded communicative spheres, are not particularly 
well equipped for complying with the ‘all affected’ principle when dealing with issues of 
transnational relevance. Indeed, both in the UK and in Netherlands, mainstream debates about Fitna 
largely excluded Muslims (Ruigrok et al, 2009; Knott, Poole and Taira, 2010). While not without its 
own drawbacks, YouTube proved well-suited for enabling an exchange among a wide range of those 
affected by Fitna, serving as a platform for a virtual and dispersed community constructed and 
defined through the articulation and interpretation of Fitna and Geert Wilders. Through making and 
uploading a video, posters performed an act or practice which constitutes them as part of this 
placeless public. Even if no-one is paying attention to this performance, the first relevance is 
nevertheless for the actor him or herself, who takes him or herself seriously as a stakeholder in a 
controversy that is otherwise played out on the distant stages of the mass media. Van Zoonen (2005, 
2007) has analysed online discussions about Hollywood and other political film and TV fiction in a 
similar vein, approaching the individual comments in these discussions as performances through 
which people construct ‘political selves’, that can be ideological, reasonable or utopian (see also 
Eliasoph, 1998). In the context of religion, it is likely that online postings (whether verbal or visual) 
also involve the performance of a religious self, inserted in or taking issue with religious authority (cf. 
Lövheim and Linderman 2005, Cheong, Halavais and Kwon, 2008).  Since Fitna’s message is that 
Muslims cannot be full citizens in contemporary Dutch society on their own terms and must be fully 
assimilated, and the same applies to other societies with a Christian-Judeo tradition, according to 
Wilders, their video responses on YouTube may, in fact, involve a performance that inserts them 
both as citizens within a national context and debate, as well as within the global controversies 
around Islam, and moreover as legitimate interpreters of their own religion.  
 Approaching the YouTube videos as performances through which people perform a political 
or religious self, makes it possible to put the question of who is actually listening temporarily 
between brackets,4 and focus instead on who participates and how. While Isin and Nielsen pertain 
that it is necessary to ask how these performances gain audibility and visibility (p.3), the preceding 
issue, and our first research question, is what kind of selves people produce through uploading their 
videos against or in favor of Fitna. In addition, a second relevant question is whether these videos 
can also be considered as performances of citizenship in this placeless community constituted by 
Fitna. Therefore, we cannot only examine how the posters claim their right to speak and perform 
their political and religious selves, but also need to assess in which context they assume their 
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  This is, however, a question we take up in a subsequent part of the research, about the views of, comments 
on and interaction between the videos.  
performance takes place and becomes meaningful. It is in this latter articulation with imagined or 
real audiences that new dimensions of citizenship may emerge. With those two questions we will 
approach the videos posted to YouTube in response to Fitna.  
Method 
We began looking at the YouTube videos already before Fitna’s release on March 28, 2008. Wilders 
had announced his film four months before its release, and in the run-up to the actual release there 
was already considerable activity on YouTube. A first systematic search on YouTube in April 2008 
delivered 3190 hits for the search term ‘Fitna’. When adding ‘Wilders’ to this search, the amount of 
hits went down to 2140.5 When revisiting YouTube for the research purpose in September and 
December 2008, some videos had been removed while the total number of hits for ‘Fitna’ had gone 
up to over 6000; ‘Fitna Wilders’ produced over 2300 hits (see Van Zoonen, Hirzalla, Müller, 2009). To 
counter the variability of the material we developed a customized e-research tool that prevented 
double-counts by identifying unique upload codes and that automatically coded all metadata such as 
date of upload, country of origin and gender as registered by the poster (for detailed information 
about the e-research tool see Vis et al., 2010)6. Through a new search using ten different keyword 
combinations (including ‘Fitna Wilders’) and entering them in to the e-tool in September 2009, we 
identified 1413 unique uploads that form our corpus for analysis. Most videos were uploaded in 
February, March, April and May of 2008 and we limited our analysis here to the 776 videos uploaded 
in these months.7  
We conducted a quantitative and qualitative content analysis using different indicators and 
data to assess whether and how these videos claim their right to speak and which audiences they 
assumed.  In order to get an overall view of the videos and a general sense of their features, we 
made a quantitative inventory based on the metadata from the e-tool (date of upload, gender, age, 
religion and country of origin as registered by the poster) and manual coding of a limited number of 
variables:  length of the video, position of the video on Islam (positive, negative, unclear), position of 
the video on Fitna (positive, negative, not about Fitna, unclear), number of views, number of 
comments and the ‘genre’ of the video. To code the genres, we used categories that were developed 
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combined with ‘Wilders’; we therefore limited further searches to YouTube, which seemed to be most 
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6  The e-research tool was developed in collaboration with Mike Thelwall, Professor in Information Science at 
Wolverhampton University, where among other things he is the head of the Statistical Cybermetrics Research 
Group (http://cybermetrics.wlv.ac.uk/).  
7
  Obviously there is a long period between the first videos in early 2008 and the moment that we stabilized our 
data in September 2009. Funding for the research, which made this more systematic approach possible 
became available from June 2009.  
in a pilot study in which we made a bottom-up, constant comparison of the videos (Van Zoonen, 
Hirzalla, Müller, 2009)8: 
Table 1. Genres in the YouTube responses to Fitna 
Testimonial or vlog Individual speaking to camera about his or her reaction to Fitna, 
understanding of Islam or other matters connected to the issue. 
Cut-and-mix Self produced video consisting of self made, or existing footage, pictures, 
images, words and sound, combined into a new ‘text’.  
Cut-and-paste Straightforward copy of existing footage from news, current affairs, 
documentary, comedy, drama and other professionally produced 
audiovisual material.  
Tagging and jamming Video carrying the tags ‘Fitna’ and/or (Geert) ‘Wilders’, meant to 
complicate finding the original film (see below for further explanation).  
Public speech or 
sermon 
Registrations of public speeches or sermons. 
Professional footage Video or films produced by professional media makers or by civic and 
religious organisations, who use YouTube as one of their key distribution 
channel. 
Other Videos that do not fit one of the previous categories 
 
In addition to the quantitative analyses, we focused on the testimonials or vlogs, cut-and-mix, and 
jamming videos for further qualitative examination, especially in order to describe in more detail 
what kinds of political and religious selves were performed in these videos, and what imaginary or 
real audiences were addressed. We left out the cut-and-paste videos, the professional footage and 
the registrations of public speech and sermons, because these appear to be using YouTube as a 
useful channel of re-distribution as part of existing practices of citizenship and are unlikely to tell us 
much about whether and how on-line forms of communication are inviting new modes of citizenship 
performance.  
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Who is reacting to Fitna, in what way and with what message?  
Most of the videos carrying one of our search terms were uploaded close to the release data of Fitna. 
The average length of the videos is about 5 minutes, the average number of views is about 24.000 
with a minimum of 40 for the least watched video (one of the Sorry-videos, see below) and a 
maximum of about 3,6 million for the most watched video, a piece to camera of an American stand-
up comedian expressing his pride in being Muslim.  In total over 10 million viewers watched one or 
more videos from our corpus, with almost 250.000 comments made altogether. These numbers show 
that YouTube was not a marginal platform in the controversy about Fitna. In combination with the 
data about the country of origin as registered by the posters, it also becomes clear that YouTube 
offered a global platform with almost half of the videos uploaded from the Netherlands, the US and 
the UK, and the other half from countries across the globe.9 The average age of the posters, as far as 
they listed it, was 32 years old, 82,5% of them registered as men, 9 % as women, and 8,5 % as 
unknown (the latter category frequently involves organisations as well as posters who do not wish to 
declare their gender).  As in most participatory spaces of the Internet, a limited number  of posters 
was responsible for uploading many different videos. A poster called Adilahmedibrahim, for instance, 
uploaded 81 videos about Islam in our corpus all of them tagged with (Geert) Wilders.   
44.6 % of the videos in our corpus expressed explicit opposition to Fitna, over a third (38.3 %) 
did not address Fitna directly, about 6 % were in favor Fitna10; these often involved reloads of (parts 
of) Fitna itself, translated into other languages, among which Spanish, Russian, Polish and Farsi. In 
total we found 44 re-uploads of Fitna itself or parts thereof . While a pro-Fitna position almost 
automatically meant an anti-Islam standpoint, anti-Fitna did not inevitably mean pro-Islam, nor did 
pro-Islam automatically mean an explicit protest against Fitna. In Figure 1 these relations are 
visualized more clearly with the bars showing the authors’ position on Fitna (pro/anti/not about 
Fitna/unclear) along with their position on the Islam debate (pro/anti Islam or unclear): 
                                                             
9 Netherlands, 28 %; US, 15 %; UK 8 %; Germany (4%), Egypt (3%), Canada (3%), Pakistan (3%), Australia (2%),  
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10 The remaining 10.8 % was unclear. 
Figure 1. Positions on Fitna and Islam 
 
From Figure 1 it becomes clear that an anti-Fitna position is as strongly connected to a neutral or 
unclear perspective on Islam, as it is with a preference for Islam.11 These anti-Fitna videos thus 
involve both a religious and a political performance, the latter possibly in opposition to the values of 
Wilders and his film, as we will further examine in the next section. The figure also shows that the 
videos that do not contain direct references to Fitna are by and large positive about Islam and thus 
seem to perform a religious identity. One video, for instance, concerned an NBC news report about 
American women converting to Islam after 9/11. The video was uploaded by users from, among 
others, Israel, France, Denmark, Germany, Australia, Japan and New Zealand, all referring the viewer 
to the same website for more information about Islam. Such a series of uploads based on one source 
video occurred more often. Re-uploads of earlier vlogs by American video maker Baba Ali for Ummah 
films, for instance, occurred regularly12, as did another video featuring a public reaction of Arabic talk 
show host Moez Masoud after the Danish cartoon crisis.13 The quantitative analysis further 
underlines this: most of the pro-Islam videos were copies of other footage (cut-and-paste).14  
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 http://www.ummahfilms.com/, last visited April 9, 2010.  
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 For instance: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uPxJ5NdELyo&feature=related  
14 X2 = 116.8, p = .000 
The general, quantitative insight into which political and religious selves are performed and in which 
way, can be specified further by a qualitative analysis of the three genres unique to online culture: 
jamming, cut-and-mix, and vlogging. 
 
Jamming and saying sorry  
In the wealth of YouTube uploads, videos explicitly saying ‘Sorry’ for Wilders’ film were the easiest to 
frame as a performance of a political self that constructs its makers both as citizens of the Dutch 
nation state, and as people with a desire to speak and apologize to a global audience. These videos 
were part of a concerted action of a Dutch avant-garde multimedia company in Amsterdam, 
Mediamatic, that launched an initiative to make many movies called ‘Fitna’, already before Fitna was 
actually released: 
“Why? Well we can’t stop Wilders. … Actually, we do not want to stop his movie because we 
cherish our freedom of expression. Even stupid populist politicians have fundamental rights. 
Especially they! We can compete for attention however. And we can produce disinformation. 
So we are going to make Movies called “Fitna” in which we apologise for Geert Wilders 
embarrassing behavior. We will make so many of them that it will be hard to find the movie by 
Wilders without finding lots of movies apologizing for it…. Let’s smother this Wilders in our 
apologies. If we work hard enough, no one will be able to find his crap among all the noise we 
produce. And the world knows how we feel about Wilders and his opportunism.”15 
Mediamatic also organized offline events to enable people to make short sorry-videos and the 
initiative was reported in most Dutch newspapers. These videos usually last no longer than 15 to 20 
seconds. They look and sound like amateur recording and come in three standard forms: in the first 
type we see one or more persons wearing a blond wig (as a parody on Wilders’ bleached hairdo) 
saying, singing and often giggling ‘sorry’, in front of a black-on-white wall text reading ‘I am sorry’; 
the second type shows uses a screen wide carton Dutch flag with a round whole in it through which a 
person puts his or her face and says ‘I am sorry’; the third type shows takes from an outdoor 
manifestation in which people carrying the wig say ‘sorry’ in the camera.  
 All these videos were given the labels ‘Geert Wilders’, ‘Fitna’ and ‘Sorry’, and they come up 
when one searches YouTube for ‘Geert Wilders’ and ‘Fitna’. The numbers of views and comments 
suggest that this collective effort to jam Fitna and offer an immediate antidote has been successful. 
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While some of these videos were accessed only a dozens of time and were left without comments, 
others drew twenty to thirty thousands hits and were commented on vividly.16 In addition, a number 
of people did not participate in the organized Mediamatic productions, but made individual videos 
copying the ‘sorry’ idea, or tagged videos with completely unrelated content with titles and labels 
about ‘Wilders’ and/or ‘Fitna’. One six second video, for instance, titled ‘Fitna, the movie by Geert 
Wilders’, shows a woman in an office setting, carrying a white coffee tray on her head and saying 
‘sorry’ into her webcam. Other videos morphed pictures of Wilders, overwriting them with big SORRY 
letters, or mixed cartoons and audiotapes saying sorry.  
What do people say about themselves by posting such videos or participating in the collective 
MediaMatic project?  Through apologizing for Wilders and his video they are basically saying: ‘we are 
not like this’; the humorous format with the blond wig is an additional key attribute through which 
distance and contempt for Wilders is demonstrated. The audience addresses is a global one, as the 
explanatory comments of MediaMatic show, and as is further underlined by the use of English 
language -  ‘I am sorry’ – instead of the Dutch. While there is no formal global entity that is 
addressed, both the performance and the assumed global audience suggest the desire of the 
participants to connect to an imagined global community.  The particular qualities of digital culture 
offer such connections: the solution is not to ban Fitna, but to make it impossible to find; a bit like 
hiding an undesirable book in a library instead of burning it. It is a performance in the context of 
organized protest that does not need much practical work, nor much cognitive or emotional 
investment, and says little else about who the posters are.  15 seconds of global citizenship, so to 
speak, for each individual, which nevertheless collectively adds up to political protest with a global 
reach.  
 
Cut and mix  
The cut and mix videos are other typical products of digital culture and abound in the YouTube 
responses to Fitna. They range from childlike drawings and words in primary colors, to sophisticated 
re-combinations of existing footage, text and sound; they vary between serious to satirical but most 
of them express an anti-Wilders or anti-Fitna position (60 %).  The satires include Shitna, Sint the 
movie, Lidna the movie or Fitna the sitcom.  In Fitna the Sitcom, for instance, the original Fitna film is 
shown but with an audio track of studio audience laughter, bursting out after each horrible image in 
Fitna, and therewith seriously undermining the threat the film tries to convey.  The video is a one-off 
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product of someone who subscribed to YouTube only to upload this three and a half minute film. 
Satire is often described as aimed at ridicule and critique in order to expose the flaws of – often – 
religion or politics. The satirical YouTube videos are obvious performances of a political self; by 
definition of the generic features of satire, the videos are contemptuous as is evident in concrete ad 
hominem attacks on Wilders himself. In some videos pictures of him are morphed, in others he is 
impersonated as speaking about human rights for Smurfs, portrayed as the evil brother of Chuckie17 
or as himself in parliament with a funny sounding voice-over claiming that he will ban Sesame Street.  
In more aggressive attacks on Wilders, his video is compared to the propaganda of the Nazi’s, which 
happens for instance in cut-and-mix productions called ‘Adolf Wilders Fitna’, or ‘Geert Hitler’. One 
whole channel is specifically dedicated to making anti Geert Wilders videos, and is maintained by 
someone called  ‘verwildering’, which is a Dutch pun on Wilders’ name which means degradation or 
dehumanization. One such video is a still picture of Wilders combined with a traffic ban sign, and a 
parental advisory sticker and a swastika pasted over Wilders’ face.  The image is uploaded three 
times with different audio-messages: one techno house rap (‘when you run into Wilders, slap that 
Bitch’), one Afghan rap (‘Jihad on my mind when I pop at ya, I think you’re blind, check you’re 
optical’) and another ‘diss’ rap  (‘middle finger in the sky for Geert Wilders’).18  As these examples 
show, the cut-and-mix videos are often the product of young individuals using the codes and 
conventions of youth and popular culture to make their point, in more or less sophisticated ways.  
The style of choice is parody and satire, morphing of pictures and ‘dissing’ (putting someone down) 
in videos that take their inspiration from rap genres.  The argumentation is usually not very elaborate 
(in one video the main text is ‘we don’t want discrimination’19), but through sound, visuals and lyrics 
strong critical emotions (anger, fear) against Wilders are expressed.  
There are a notable exceptions to his general tendency in the cut-and-mix videos, and those 
concern the Bible versions of Fitna, titled, for instance, Fitna (Bible version), Fitna the movie (what 
about the bible?) Geert wilders the movie Fitna “Bible version”, or Fitna-Schism (The Bible version of 
Fitna). Of these, the latter – Schism – is the best-known and most popular one,, which we found re-
uploaded nine times in our corpus. It was made by Saoudi blogger Raed Al Saeed: ‘This is a movie I 
made in less than 24 hours in response to Geert Wilders's Anti-Islam Movie "Fitna"’, the argument 
being that it is easy to make such videos with other holy books. 20 The video shows footage of 
American soldiers beating up civilians in their compound and a US evangelic group led by a blonde 
woman teaching children to become soldiers for the Christian war. When he posted his video on 
                                                             
17 The evil doll of the Child Play movies.  
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 http://www.youtube.com/user/verwildering, last accessed April 7, 2010. 
19
 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0ZgCwhuD4Rs, last accessed on April 7, 2010. 
20 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uWPg_KiIL7Q  
YouTube, it was first removed for ‘having inappropriate content’, but after Al Saeed claimed that 
Fitna should then be banned as well, the video was put up again.21 Schism and the other Bible 
versions of Fitna, have a similar structure to Fitna, using brutal quotes from the Bible and 
interspersing them with images of violence, often footage from the invasion in Iraq and occupied 
Palestine, but also fast changing footage showing different animal predators often attacking and 
killing prey set to dramatic classical music. According to these videos or additional information given 
by the posters the purpose is not to vilify the Bible or Christians. Instead their aim was to show that 
one could abuse the Bible in a similar way as Wilders abused the Quran, to claim that Christianity is 
by definition a violent religion. Hence, the Saudi Arabian poster quoted above says how easy it was 
to make his Bible film. Other videos similarly deconstruct the demagogy of Fitna, analyzing ‘the 
outplayed and cheap tactics’ to discredit Islam,22 for instance, by showing how the Quran verses that 
Wilders uses are quoted out of context.23  Inevitably, one poster reacted again to these Bible 
varieties, making a video asking Fitna or Schism and claiming that Fitna or Schism is not about 
religion but about politics. The video ends with a picture of U2 singer Bono carrying his Co-exist 
blindfold.24  
While the satirical cut-and-mix videos basically make an appeal to audience emotions such as 
anger or contempt, the Bible versions of Fitna are built on the assumption that it can be explained 
and shown to audiences that Fitna is a demagogic representation of Islam, and that such negative 
propaganda can be produced using  the Bible as a source as well. It is an appeal to cognition and 
reason of audiences. 
 
Testimonials  
The Sorry videos and the cut-and-mix productions were made specifically to react to Fitna. The 
testimonials about Fitna were more often part of an embedded institutional or individual practice of 
vlogging. British comedian Pat Condell, (in)famous for his anti-religious comedy, uses YouTube 
instead of live performance  for his ‘Godless’ jokes.  In one of his videos he responds to Fitna for 6.49 
minutes, supporting the film’s point that Islam is violent (‘Islam without violence is like an egg-free 
omelette’) and scorning all the ‘headless chickens’ who dare not speak up.25  Through this and his 
other videos Condell performs a staunch anti-religious self who is on a mission to discredit all 
                                                             
21 Some links to the video still require the visitor to register as over 18 (dd. April 12, 2010) 
22  http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z2806UIdCJE, last accessed April 7, 2010. 
23
  http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ngGf3HRhneg&feature=related, last accessed April 7, 2010. 
24
  http://www.youtube.com/user/kellibelli530, last accessed April 9, 2010.  
25 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OxbYBIlT6VE&feature=related, last accessed on April 6, 2010.  
religions and believers, including Islam and Muslims. It is a performance of a political identity that is 
clearly incompatible with religious identity and speaks to his usual fans, but also to an assumed 
audience of non-believers.   
Another stand-up comedy that came up with our search terms, was a particularly popular video 
produced by the Muslim American Society (MAS) in which a young man, standing on stage in front of 
a dark background with the camera frequently showing his face in close up, starts speaking facing the 
camera: ‘Hi, I am not a terrorist or a date merchant, I don’t live in a tent or keep my wife zipped up in 
it everyday, and for the record, I knew who she was before I married her’.  This ironic beginning, 
strongly enhanced by the various items (camel, tent, white robe) appearing on screen when 
mentioned, is a clear address to the stereotypes that many people hold about Islam and shows a 
willingness to present an alternative, modern understanding of Islam. Halfway through the video the 
tone changes from humorous to a emotional praise of Islam, and the scientific and cultural 
achievements of Muslims, ending in the proud declaration: ‘My name is Muhammed and I am a 
Muslim’. The self that is constructed here is that of a Muslim who does not experience nor 
acknowledge stereotypes of Islam as a religion that is at odds with the values of US society: ‘Trust 
me, I would go back to my own country, but I am already in it’, after which a picture of the US flag is 
inserted. The video is a perfect example of the performance of a religious self that also articulated a 
democratic and inclusive political self: ‘I believe in peace; I believe in people of all different religions 
and beliefs living together in harmony’.26 
Many of the vlogs came from societal and religious organisations, and from individuals who are 
regular vloggers. Their videos and their performance of politics and religion vary as much as their 
organisations and projects.  Only occasionally, we found a video that could be considered an 
occasional one-off vlog.  A particularly telling one comes from a young white Dutch man, who posted 
his video the day after the Fitna release. His video starts with a text in white font on a green 
background: ‘My perspective on this movie and the controversial topic of religion and islam in 
today’s society. (I have typed down my perspective and read it out loud, therefore it seems a bit 
‘from reading’;)). The preparation and typing of the text beforehand suggests cognitive and 
presentational effort, a strong investment in the issue, and an implicit acknowledgment that this may 
be an uncommon gesture among the more informal styles of YouTube. The ensuing seven minutes 
shows the young man in medium close up in a dim lit room, who begins his reading with ‘Hello, I am 
Dutch and I wonder why people get Islamophobia’. The nationality statement is exceptional; it 
connects the speaker not only to Wilders, who is also Dutch, but also works to make clear to the 
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 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQXh20OuhIc, last accessed on April 6, 2010, viewed 3674342 on that 
date. 
wider community of Fitna posters that there are other Dutch non-Muslim voices from the 
Netherlands that do not support Wilders. He then articulates how differences between people are 
tied up with power, hatred and ignorance (‘the root of all evil’), and expresses the shock he felt while 
watching Fitna, especially regarding Wilders’ ignorance about a world religion. Using a verse from the 
Quran he endorses peace and understanding between people, civilizations, nations and religions, ‘no 
matter what, humanity first. Thank you for listening, bye.’27 This is a video that shows the poster 
performing both as a political self by expressing his views on Wilders and as a citizen to the emerging 
community by welcoming his audience, apologizing for his (reading) mode of address and thanking 
them for their attention.  
 
Discussion  
In this contribution, we claimed that the current multimedia environment makes it necessary and 
possible to think of citizenship as a performance, in addition to citizenship as a status within the 
boundaries of a nation state, or as an acknowledged identity within a more or less demarcated polity. 
In the context of global controversies, crises and conflicts there are no ‘citizens’ in the traditional 
sense of inhabitants or members of a world polity, nevertheless there are many people who feel that 
they are key stakeholders and want to express their engagement. Together, they constitute the 
community of all those ‘affected by principle’ who should have a chance to participate if a debate is 
to be considered truly ‘public’ (cf. Frazer 2007). The border-circumventing, highly visual digital 
technologies make such participation easier as was clear in our analysis of the hundreds of video 
reactions to the vicious anti-Islam movie Fitna, made by a member of the Dutch parliament.  The 
sheer numbers of YouTube activities around Fitna (videos, views and comments) demonstrated that 
this was not at all a marginal phenomenon within the wider Fitna and Wilders controversies, making 
the question as to what these videos mean, or – to be more precise - for which contexts the posters 
make them meaningful, all the more pressing.  
We approached the videos uploaded in response to Fitna, as acts and practices in a placeless 
public debate, in which people claimed their right to speak and perform their political and/or 
religious selves, in connection to an assumed audience. It is in connection to these assumed 
audiences that citizenship may or not may emerge. As Hartley suggests in this volume, citizenship can 
be approached as ´an association of strangers´, and in the case of our YouTube videos the question 
thus is whether and how this association with the ´stranger/audience’ is enabled by the videos. We 
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   http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Fzbs2uN_aXI, , last accessed April 6, 2010, see for a similar case: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eY717N-rcl4.  
found, on the basis of our quantitative analysis, that the most common YouTube reaction for 
Muslims was to upload copies of videos that expressed their own understanding of Islam as a 
peaceful religion in contrast to the picture drawn by Wilders. In many of these cases, the video did 
not directly address Fitna or Wilders, but the titles and tags that the posters added to their videos 
made clear that they performed their religious selves in the context of Wilders’ and other anti-Islam 
messages.  Their videos thus perform a kind of  citizenship, an outreach to strangers as it were, that 
is based on the desire to present a true picture of oneself to others, and to solve misunderstandings.  
Our more detailed analysis of the video genres unique to visual digital culture (tagging/jamming, cut-
and-mix and vlogs) showed that each invited their own kinds of political and religious performances, 
and assumed particular traits and interests of their audience. The jamming videos saying sorry were 
unique digital means of activism, enabling a particular participation in the controversy around Fitna 
that assumed a global audience open to apology. It can be seen as a performance of a civic virtue 
that Allison Jaggar (2000) has identified as crucial for citizenship in multicultural societies, that is 
cultural recognition, which entails the willingness and capacity to align with the experiences of 
cultural ‘others’.  The apologies in the Sorry videos testify in that sense of an understanding, on the 
side of the posters, of the damaging effects of stereotypical and insulting representation of Islam on 
its adherents.   The cut-and-mix videos, appeared to be especially welcome means for satire and 
parody demonstrating both the posters’ immersion in global popular culture, and their political 
selves in protest to Geert Wilders and his anti-Islam project.  The particular performance of 
citizenship taking place here, has historical roots going back at least to  the 17th century satirical 
pamphlet culture which attacked many a royal or regent in power, and which has undermined 
dominant political culture ever since.  While these kinds of cut-and-mix videos primarily addressed 
audience emotions (anger, fear, contempt), the Bible cut-and-mix videos positioned audiences as 
cognitively competent and capable to disentangle the visual demagogy in Fitna.  Together with the 
vlogs, these videos are best understood as performances of well informed selves articulated with a 
classic modernist understanding of citizenship, addressing others equally well informed or – at least – 
willing to be informed . It ties these videos and vlogs about Fitna, to a classic conceptualization of the 
public sphere, as the term ‘vlogosphere’ as it has been called in analogy with the blogopshere 
(Griffith and Papacharissi, 2010) suggests.   
These cases demonstrate that the YouTube videos cannot be typified as enabling one kind of 
citizenship performance; we found several ones instead that nevertheless have one thing in common 
and that is their assumption about an audience out there. This implies a fundamental 
‘connectedness’ of the YouTube performances that takes two forms: that of real connections to an 
already existing practice of religious and political participation, as is clear from the videos connected 
to the vlogosphere and from the many online manifestations of Islamic faith, and that of individual, 
one-off acts of video participation in the Fitna controversy and the assumed virtual audience. A 
desire to make a connection to dispersed others is thus what binds both the occasional acts and 
embedded practices of political and religious performance in reaction to Fitna on YouTube. A further 
commonality is that these attempts are molded in cognitive, emotional, humorous, denigrating, 
amiable, absurdist and other ways, but that none of them were violent or aggressive. Although we 
found many references to Wilders as Hitler, we did not find videos actually engaging in neo-Nazist 
hate speech; similarly, while many videos showed Islamist terrorism there were none in our data that 
supported extremist Islamism and propagated violence. Obviously, such videos do exist, but they did 
not come up in this YouTube debate. As the initial removal of the Schism video suggests, this maybe 
as much the result of enforcement of the YouTube user guidelines, as it could be of the way the 
posters want to make connections, within the admittedly wide boundaries of online civility 
(Papacharissi, 2004).  
We propose, in closing, that it is in this context of such attempts at ‘connectivity’ that the 
online performance of political and religious selves can become particular acts and practices of 
(unlocated) citizenship; citizenship that is not defined by its relation to an institutional or communal 
entity, but that takes its form with respect to dispersed other people, in the double sense of that 
word.  In the classic ‘rights’ and ‘obligations’ terminology of citizenship, and articulated with the 
affordances of YouTube, this would involve both the right to speak/show and the obligation to 
listen/watch.  While the sheer numbers of production and consumption of the videos suggest that 
that is exactly what happened with the Fitna responses, such a notion of citizenship as connectivity 
need to be further explored by looking at the particular patterns of interaction between the posters 
and their audiences, as they subscribe to each others channels, react to each others videos and 
discuss among each other. These are the questions for a subsequent investigation about the YouTube 
responses to Fitna.  
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